“Stop oligopoly” or “Share the wealth”

Annual marijuana license auctions, mentioned here recently, are a dream in Theoryland, I’m afraid.  (At least they would tilt toward sun-grown – no one would build an indoor grow with a one-year license.)  A more realistic way to time-limit economic power – sunsetted quotas – is on the table in New Zealand now.

Is Canada stopping oligopoly, or sharing the wealth?  Uruguay?  

Revenue options seem a side-show to the real business of allocating licenses.  And worrying about their transferability.  I’m afraid of a cannabis version of Carlos Slim.  (And government monopoly – is PEMEX a success story?)

Annual license auctions are a dream in Theoryland, I’m afraid.  (At least they would tilt toward sun-grown – no one would build an indoor grow with a one-year license.)  

But sunsetted quotas are on the table in New Zealand now.   Licenses next?

MUCD panel today heard me rant against preferential licenses.

Sharing marijuana wealth in Mexico — Panel September 8.

I’m to be on a panel Tuesday, September 8 at 1:30 EDT on cannabis legalization in Mexico – especially preventing oligopoly and market capture by Big Marijuana. It’s open to everyone, in English and Spanish, but you must register first at this link: https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJYrduCqqzwuE9L3YolRLGPZPtbpIYSDgPi3.

Here are some notes for that panel.

There are possible conflicting goals for tax policy – provide revenue to distribute (maybe to casualties of the Drug War); prevent price collapse to protect public health; nudge in favor of small or deserving businesses.  Administration and feasibility hang over any of those goals.  Taxation is just one design feature, and it interacts with a host of others.  And I know very little about the situation on the ground in Mexico – cannabis culture: the existing market; any role of organized crime.

This is a very hard problem.  Here is a tentative list of options, addressing “avoid hoarding,” and “attaching price to product potency, the nature of the taxes.”  Some of these options may not fit Mexico at all.

+++

OPTIONS

— Retail monopoly

— High taxes

Continue reading “Sharing marijuana wealth in Mexico — Panel September 8.”

Sharing weed wealth — Annual license auctions

A while back, the late Mark Kleiman wrote ““handing out production rights for modest fixed licensing fees . . . [means that] any gain from scarcity pricing will go to the industry and encourage even more vigorous marketing. If, instead, production quotas were put up for auction, the gain could go to the taxpayers. . . . [P]roduction quotas with an auction would be the equivalent of taxes.”

Nineteenth century India, the pioneer in cannabis policy, did just that.  It both imposed taxes and held annual license auctions. “For the retail vend of ganja, charas, and bhang . . . [t]he number of shops is fixed by the Collector according to the demand for the drug. The licenses are sold by public auction for one year.” 

More recently, the State of Louisiana enacted this:  “The Department of Agriculture and Forestry shall develop an annual, nontransferable specialty license for the production of prescribed marijuana for therapeutic use and shall limit the number of such licenses granted in the state.”  That annual cannabis license auction was a backstop or Plan B if state universities elected not to grow cannabis – but they are growing, so there are no annual licenses.

Continue reading “Sharing weed wealth — Annual license auctions”

Issues with the MORE Act

Tax issues with the MORE Act first

I.  280E repeal

 The MORE Act repeals 280E, perhaps the most useful marijuana tax model of all.  (Descheduling marijuana takes if off the bad list cross-reference in 280E.)  280E, denying deductions for selling expenses, makes advertising and marketing more expensive, after tax.  Weed ads, like these “sex sells” billboards, irritate parents.  

The MORE Act devotes revenue dollars to casualties of the War on Drugs, but the tax side is not so friendly.  280E is basically a tax on retailers, and turns out to favor Mom & Pop – or the social equity licensee – over Big Retail Marijuana, like retail chains such as John Boehner’s Acreage Holdings.  

While small businesses may rely on reputation and word of mouth, Big Business advertises.  Recently, “$1 out of every $6 spent on restaurant advertising in America [was] done by McDonald’s.” 

Continue reading “Issues with the MORE Act”

Center for New Revenue isn’t enthused by the MORE marijuana legalization bill

       

{Update 4 September 2020: Instead of “Center for New Revenue opposes MORE marijuana legalization bill.” I’m thinking of toning this down to “does not support.” This bill is a political stunt; it doesn’t matter.]

Only in 2015, with Responsible Ohio and its blatant greed, has the Center for New Revenue opposed a marijuana legalization measure.  

With a bias toward small business and sharing power if not wealth, the Center opposes H.R. 3884, the MORE Act:

1.  It repeals 280E, perhaps the most useful marijuana tax model of all.

2.  It imposes only a primitive ad valorem tax, which will quickly fade.

The Center does not oppose the STATES Act, despite both those objections, because only the MORE Act opens up marijuana to interstate commerce.  This will bring a quick end to experimentation with regulatory models, which we desperately need.  We still don’t agree even on how to tax – y mucho, mucho mas.

Bring on the STATES Act.  Or fix the taxes.  Or wait ‘til next year.  

280E should be the only federal hemp drug tax.

Folks have to pay income tax ANYWAY.  Just keep 280E, so marijuana sellers can’t deduct selling expenses.  The rich, or at least high earners, pay more in this economically progressive way – and don’t have the federal government reaching its tentacles into the capillaries of hemp drug trade.  (MORE’s ad valorem tax could turn out to be amazingly intrusive.)  280E requires no new bureaucracy – not a single form.  Selling expenses are not so easily disguised.  

Here’s the Argument that 280E should be the only federal hemp drug tax ever:  It was designed as punishment.  It’s that high — it’s more than enough.  But by now, the marijuana community can manage 280E as well as any new other tax.  The devil you know. 

Ads and marketing are a good target for a tax. Retailers hire their own lobbyists, because they’re the ones 280E hurts, but some of the marijuana community I’m familiar with says, “Who needs retailers?  We did fine for years without them.”

Anti-weed-ad diatribe is at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/12/18/how-bob-dole-got-america-addicted-to-marijuana-taxes/#disqus_thread.

How high should marijuana revenue be?

Marijuana revenue depends on a value judgment:  What tax burden is appropriate?  

Some of my friends would tax marijuana like milk, on principle.  Some would exempt it, and subsidize it.  Some would tax the heck out of it.  Others would try to raise only enough to match current drug harm costs; others would add revenue for Victims of the Drug War.  Let the philosophers and the interest groups sort that out.    

That’s a draft. Comments welcomed.

Cannabis weight-based tax in grams (local currency)

Cannabis weight-based tax in grams (local currency)
AlaskaCaliforniaColoradoMaineNevadaCanada 
Bud/flower$1.76 $0.34 $0.33 $0.74 $0.71 $1 
Leaves/trim$0.53 $0.10 $0.10 $0.21 $0.17 $0.25 
Fresh/Wet whole plant$0.05 $0.06  $0.09  
Small bud (NV); Abnormal & immature bud (AK)$0.88    $0.56  
Bud for extraction $0.20  $0.18  
Trim for extraction  $0.07  $0.17  
Alaska has no retail ad valorem tax; all the other states do. Canada has an alternative minimum tax. This updates the previous post, showing statutory rates as adjusted.

Marijuana weight taxes in the world today

AlaskaCaliforniaColoradoMaineNevadaCanada
Bud/flower$50/oz.$9.65/oz.$150/lb.$335/lb.$321.75/lb.$1/gram
Leaves/trim$15/oz$2.87/oz.$45/lb.$94/lb.$76.95/lb.$0.25/gram
Fresh/Wet whole plant$1.35/oz.$26.4/lb.$41.25/lb.
Small bud (NV); Abnormal & immature bud (AK)$25/oz.$254.4/lb.
Bud for extraction$89.85/lb.$82.65/lb.
Trim for extraction$30.3/lb.$76.65/lb.
States other than Alaska have retail taxes, too. Canada has an alternative minimum tax of 10%, but taxes concentrated products at one cent per milligram of THC.

For citations to state authorities, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/tax/marijuana-AMR and https://newrevenue.org/2020/08/01/cannabis-weight-tax-rates-bud-and-trim-u-s-and-canada/#more-6492

I’m hoping a Research Assistant will materialize to convert rates to gram equivalents.

Newrevenue.org to be archived by Library of Congress

Webcapture [Library of Congress]5:11 PM (3 hours ago)
to me

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Critism of analysis of local marijuana taxes in California

“an independent California cannabis tax expert . . . said that . . . the city (Lemon Grove) could bring in $560,000 at 4 percent and $1.12 million at 8 percent.”

https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/east-county/lemon-grove/story/2020-07-11/lemon-grove-moves-forward-on-taxing-cannabis-dispensaries

$560,000 X 2 = $1.12 million.

So if the city taxed it at 16%, they would bring in $2.24 million, and if they taxed it at 32%, they would bring in $4.48 million, and if they taxed it at 64%, they would bring in $9.96 million?

Well, there wouldn’t be a huge drop-off going from 4% to 8%, but there would be at least SOME bit of migration to the black market and to lower-tax jurisdictions.  So revenues would not exactly double.  They’d be less.

Close enough for government work?

How tax competition can threaten marijuana revenue

How tax competition can threaten marijuana revenue

Pat Oglesby, opinion contributor

Here’s what to know about cannabis tax competition.

Tax marijuana by potency? $50 reward for finding a jurisdiction that does for cigarettes.

“I’ve challenged people over and over, including at conferences and on twitter, to name a jurisdiction that taxes tobacco by nicotine content, and no one has.” On 4 September 2018, I wrote that, and it’s still true.

Make that “unconcentrated tobacco” or “cigarettes.” Now that vaping has caught on, I wouldn’t rule out taxing vaping material by nicotine content.  It’s concentrated, so it’s homogeneous.  And it’s workable to tax marijuana concentrates by THC, like Canada.

But taxing unconcentrated plant material is SUCH a bad idea that no jurisdiction does it for analagous cigarettes.  Sampling allows cheating and manipulation.  These products are not homogeneous.  If that’s a deal killer for tobacco, why isn’t it for cannabis?

So maybe this is a publicity stunt.  The first message RECEIVED naming a jurisdiction that taxes cigarettes by nicotine content gets a $50 reward.  Write contest@newrevenue.org.

How notches or discontinuities in a weed tax are an unnecessary vestige of the primitive Scales of Justice “range” method of liquor taxation

The notion that marijuana flower is best taxed by measuring its THC content refuses to die.  Illinois backed into a THC tax on flower with a rule that smokeable marijuana with THC over a certain percentage (35% or so) is taxed at a higher rate ad valorem – 25% versus 10% for less potent stuff.

Why didn’t Illinois tax by THC directly?  To answer a different question, no jurisdiction in the world taxes tobacco by tar nicotine content.  ($50 prize for first person to identify such a current tax.)  THC in flower is impractical to measure, so a wide “range” of up to 35% should cover it all.  Flower rarely exceeds 35% THC; most smokeable concentrates do.

Leaving aside the weakness of ad valorem taxes, why didn’t they just tax raw plant material at one rate and smokeable concentrates at another?  The rush of getting legislation to move, according to one report, without getting into the fine points.

So there’s a notch.  34.999% hits you with one tax bill; 35.001% hits you with a tax bill 150% higher.  (Gaming possibilities, are listed in the BOTEC report for the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, like spraying flower with concentrates to land comfortably below 35%.)

Notches, or discontinuities in tax rates producing marginal rates over 100%, are  usually suboptimal.  Some may be unavoidable, like the UK VAT threshold.  With 499,999 pounds sterling in turnover, there’s no VAT.  With 500,001, you owe VAT on each transaction.  Now that’s awkward, and calls for prediction (if it’s not based on the previous year’s numbers,) but how else could you work it?  To have identical transactions taxed differently would be weird.  One customer sneaks tax free in before the 500k threshold, but the next customer in line that day pays the tax.

But discontinuities for excise taxes may not be necessary.  They used to be.  They  began, I think, with the liquor tax.  Higher proof spirits weigh less than weak ones, so weighing the batch reveals the alcohol content.  But digital scales weren’t invented when the United States (for instance) started taxing liquor, so they HAD to tax by ranges with discontinuities.  The old Scales of Justice scales, which operated by adding weights “only one at a time,” were all they had – with an alcohol adaptation called “Dicas’s hydrometer.”  So they had six ranges – unavoidable then, for differentiation, but at least internally accurate, and unbeatable by sampling.

 

Ads and 280E

I’m giving a marijuana tax design talk to a Law School class at a major university on April 9.  One point I plan to make is that Tax Code section 280E, which makes marijuana advertising and marketing expenses nondeductible, is a good idea.  Ads enjoy protection under the commercial free speech doctrine, so states can’t ban them, but states, like the federal government, can make them nondeductible.  The professor saw some slides I put together, and didn’t think these were a useful part of an academic discussion.  Photos thanks to Lynn Silver, Public Health Institute of California.

CNR Vermont memo on 280E conformity

To:                   S.54 Conference Committee

From:             Pat Oglesby, Center for New Revenue

Re:                   Effectively Restricting Cannabis Advertisements via Tax Policy

Date:                March 11, 2020

Current Law

Current Vermont tax law follows Federal Internal Revenue Code §280E, allowing sellers of cannabis (whether or not licensed by the state) to deduct only their “cost of goods sold” – that is, the cost of producing or buying the cannabis they sell.

Under 280E, growers can deduct almost everything.  Nearly all their costs, such as salaries, rent, and electricity are treated as “cost of goods sold,” because they are inputs to producing cannabis.

Retailers, however, can typically only deduct only what they pay for the product itself.  They cannot deduct salaries, for instance, because that is an expense of selling cannabis, not of producing or buying it.  Similarly, 280E prohibits the deduction of advertisement costs.

As it looks at legalization, Vermont can consider carefully, ahead of the federal government, what to do about marijuana advertising.

 

Possible Options:

The House’s version of S.54 seeks to repeal 280E “conformity” for Vermont, and allow all selling expenses to be deducted for state income tax purposes.  This treats cannabis like every other business, which certainly seems an equitable approach – but it also would make advertising expenses tax deductible.  This would effectively create a state subsidy of cannabis advertising.

By adopting an amendment sponsored by Rep. Donahue, the House chose to completely ban cannabis advertising.  Such a blanket ban may be an unconstitutional infringement on “commercial free speech” – the case law is unsettled on the question. It may be that such a ban is permissible under Vermont’s Constitution, and that Federal courts would not take up such a case while Federal prohibition remains in place – but query how long Federal prohibition will last.  If Vermont’s blanket ban on advertisements is ultimately struck down, there will be no restriction on cannabis advertisements.

Alternative 1: Say what’s NOT deductible.

Denying deductions for advertising is a place to start.  Listing other non-deductible selling expenses like excessive salaries stifles potential constitutional challenges.

Alternative 2:  Say what IS deductible.

A more nuanced approach would be to only re-allow certain 280E-disallowed expenses, keeping all others (including advertising expenses) non-deductible.  The Legislature could be guided by broadly acceptable social goals – allowing, for example, deductions for W-2 employee pay and benefits, maybe up to a cap (say, $100,000 per person per year).  A limited list of deductions could favor labor over capital, and small businesses over large ones (“mom and pop” shops use word of mouth and the personal touch to attract customers, not capital).

Possible additional allowable deductions include 1099 “gig” workers, and service providers like lawyers.  Charitable contributions sound nice, but are often disguised promotions. Real estate interests would push hard for rent to be deductible, but parents like to keep retail spaces non-glitzy and unappealing.

Conclusion:

A blanket ban on advertisement is likely to encounter Federal and State Constitutional challenges.  If such a ban is enacted, and then overturned, the State would not have any effective retractions on cannabis advertisements on the books, and the Legislature would have to scramble to enact them, over the objections of an industry that is likely to have more lobbying clout in the future than it has now.

By reverting to the restrictions on advertisements in the pre-Donahue House version of S.54 (i.e., audience restrictions, requiring pre-approval of all marketing materials, along with payment of a material review fee, etc.), and ensuring that cannabis advertisements are not inadvertently subsidized by allowing their costs to be deducted for state income tax purposes, S.54 would better protect Vermonters from the dangers of widespread advertisements intended to increase potentially problematic use.